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HEALING THE BLIND GODDESS: 
RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Mark D. Rosenbaum* 
Daniel P. Tokaji** 
No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE .AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM. By David Cole. New York: The New Press. 1999. 
Pp. ix, 218. $25. 
That justice is a blind goddess 
Is a thing to which we black are wise. 
Her bandage hides two festering sores 
That once perhaps were eyes.1 
It ain't no secret, 
Ain't no secret my friend, 
You can get killed just for living 
In your American skin.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Once again, issues of race, ethnicity, and class within our criminal 
justice system have been thrust into the public spotlight. On both 
sides of the country, in our nation's two largest cities, police are being 
called to account for acts of violence directed toward poor people of 
color. 
In New York City, a West African immigrant named Amadou 
Diallo was killed by four white police officers, who fired forty-one 
bullets at the unarmed man as he stood in the vestibule of his apart-
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1970, University 
of Michigan; J.D. 1974, Harvard. - Ed. The authors would like to thank Professors Evan 
Caminker and Sam Gross for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Review; 
the editors of the Michigan Law Review for their helpful edits; and Barbara Garavaglia and 
Dawne Adam of the University of Michigan Law Library for their invaluable research assis­
tance. 
** A.B. 1989, Harvard; J.D. 1994, Yale. - Ed. 
1. LANGSTON HUGHES, Justice, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 31 
(Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., Alfred A.  Knopf, Inc. 1994) (1923). 
2. Bruce Springsteen, American Skin (41 Shots) (unreleased 2000) (recording on file 
with authors). 
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ment building in a poor section of the Bronx.3 Did race influence the 
officers' decisions to fire the fatal shots? Did the social class of Mr. 
Diallo or of the jury in Albany, to which the officers' trials were trans­
ferred, influence the decision to acquit the officers?4 
In Los Angeles, a former officer with the CRASH5 Unit of the Los 
Angeles Police Department's Rampart Division has described, in ex­
cruciating detail, at least thirty police officers' repeated misuses of 
their authority in an impoverished area of predominantly Latino im­
migrants.6 The scandal, which the Police Department itself conserva­
tively estimates to implicate a staggering 120 cases, involved the 
shooting of unarmed people, conspiracies to put the innocent in jail, 
planting guns on suspects, and orchestrating the deportation of wit­
nesses to police abuses.7 Could such massive and flagrant abuses of 
police power have festered for so long if they had instead transpired in 
a white, middle-class neighborhood? 
Even aside from their obvious political and social significance, 
these disturbing events raise questions of enormous constitutional 
moment. For if race, ethnicity, and class do in fact play a role in the 
enforcement of our criminal laws - if, for example, race-based stereo­
typing influenced the police officers' decision to fire on Mr. Diallo, or 
if the poverty and ethnicity of those victimized in Los Angeles con­
tributed to the lawlessness of the CRASH Unit and the numerous du­
bious convictions obtained as a result8 - then inquiry must also be di­
rected at the criminal justice system as a whole. From police, to juries, 
to prosecutors, and perhaps even to legislative bodies, the system be-
3 .  See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man ls 
Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at Al; Kevin Flynn, Police Killing Draws National Notice, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at BS. 
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, A Story the Jury Never Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, 
at A15 (editorial) (noting that a Bronx jury might have had "a better, more informed basis 
for judging the reasonableness of the quick-draw strategy of the street crimes unit in the 
Bronx" than the Albany jury that acquitted the four officers). 
5. "CRASH" is an acronym for "Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums." See 
Joe Domanick, Too Close for Justice, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at Ml (editorial). 
6. See Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Police in Secret Group Broke Law Routinely, Tran­
scripts Say, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at AL The cases investigated so far stretch from 1995 
to 1998. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, LAPD Chief Calls for Mass Dismissals of Tainted 
Cases, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at AL 
7. See Tina Daunt, Rampart Settlements Could Hit $125 Million Scandal: The City 
Council is Stunned When Told to Brace for Lawsuits Stemming from 120 Cases, Sources Say, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3 ,  2000, at Al. 
8. As of February 11, 2000, thirty-two convictions had been reversed as the result of the 
Rampart scandal, and twenty officers had been suspended, relieved of duty, fired, or had 
quit. See Tina Daunt & Henry Weinstein, Officials Renew Call for Outside Probe of LAPD: 
Broader Corruption Allegations Fuel Outrage. Mayor MaintaillS That Department Can In­
vestigate Itself, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at Al. One senior INS official has stated that 
LAPD officers "were targeting a whole race of people." Anne-Marie O'Connor, Rampart 
Set Up Latinos to Be Deported, INS Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at AL 
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gins to appear inimical to our core constitutional values. We would 
like to believe that our criminal justice system does more than pay lip 
service to the command of equality .. We would like to believe that 
everyone, whether black, brown, or white, and whether rich or poor, 
will be treated fairly. We would like to believe that the administration 
of criminal justice lives up to the pledge carved into the frieze of the 
United States Supreme Court building for all to see: "EQUAL JUS­
TICE UNDER LAW." But does it? 
The thesis that America's criminal justice system institutionally 
discriminates along race and class lines is scarcely new.9 Yet, notwith­
standing the weight of this claim as it bears on the prQper functioning 
of a constitutional democracy, it has never been presented to the Su­
preme Court as such. However odd this may first appear, no decision 
of the Court has confronted head-on the staggering implications of 
such an unequal system in a society that aspires to egalitarianism. 
While the Court has, in the past, voided discriminatory school1° and 
electoral systems,11 the criminal justice system has largely escaped such 
scrutiny. The Court, of course, has considered challenges to specific 
procedures that disproportionately affect poor people and minorities, 
such as the failure to provide counsel to indigent defendants12 and 
backroom interrogations without benefit of counsel.13 It has also con­
sidered alleged racial discrimination in the administration of the death 
penalty.14 But, as if granted immunity, the criminal justice system as a 
9. See, e.g., JOHN J. DONOHUE & STEVEN D. LEVITT, THE IMPACT OF RACE ON 
POLICING, ARREST PATTERNS, AND CRIME (1997); JEWELLE TAYLOR GIBBS, RACE AND 
JUSTICE: RODNEY KING AND 0.J. SIMPSON IN A HOUSE DIVIDED (1996); CORAMAE 
RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993); JEROME G. MILLER, 
SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(1996); GREGORY D. RUSSELL, THE DEATH PENALTY AND RACIAL BIAS: OVERTURNING 
SUPREME COURT ASSUMPTIONS (1994); MICHAEL H. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT- RACE, 
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF 
JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (1996). 
10. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (requiring school boards op­
erating a dual school system to "convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination 
would be eliminated root and branch"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) 
(holding that racial segregation of schools is "inherently unequal"). 
11. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that re­
quiring payment of poll tax as precondition for voting violates Equal Protection Clause); 
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (invalidating Georgia's system of selecting repre­
sentatives on the ground that "all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote­
whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, 
and whatever their home may be in that geographic unit"). 
12. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
13. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
14. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481U.S. 279 (1987). 
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whole appears to be the component of government that the Four­
teenth Amendment's commandment of equality left behind.15 
Constitutional litigation is often expressive of a sense of moral ur­
gency, alerting both the judiciary and society at large to government's 
failure to live up to the Constitution's promise.16 The question, then, is 
why this sense of moral urgency has generally not attended judicial 
consideration of the criminal justice system? Does ingrained discrimi­
nation within the criminal justice system fall outside the limits of con­
stitutional jurisprudence? If so, are those limits inherent or by craft? 
And should we not consider whether, instead of being exempt from 
constitutional scrutiny, racial inequalities within the criminal justice 
system should actually receive especially careful attention?17 
II. COLE'S PORTRAIT OF THE BLIND GODDESS 
David Cole's No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American 
Criminal Justice System18 argues that the criminal justice "system's le­
gitimacy turns on equality before the law, but the system's reality 
could not be further from that ideal" (p. 3). As Cole sees it: 
[T]he administration of criminal law - whether by the officer on the 
beat, the legislature, or the Supreme Court - is in fact predicated on the 
exploitation of inequality . . . . Absent race and class disparities, the priv­
ileged among us could not enjoy as much constitutional protection of our 
liberties as we do; and without those disparities, we could not afford the 
policy of mass incarceration that we have pursued over the past two dec­
ades. [p. 5] 
As this theme dictates, No Equal Justice amasses an impressive set 
of statistics and case studies to expose the fiction that police depart­
ments, prosecutors, juries, courts, and legislatures operate in race- and 
class-neutral fashion.19 No facet of the criminal justice system goes 
15. This seems even more strange when one considers that the fair administration of 
criminal justice is a prominent concern of the Constitution generally and the Bill of Rights in 
particular, specifically the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. We discuss this 
point infra Section IV.B. 
16. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE QVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION {1978); Abram Chayes, 
How Does the Constitution Establish Justice? 101 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1041 {1988); Abram 
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 {1976); 
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1998 Tenn - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 {1979). 
17. Although the book reviewed here addresses both race- and class-based inequalities 
in the administration of criminal justice, our focus in this Review is principally upon the 
question of race. 
18. David Cole is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University, and an attorney with 
the Center for Constitutional Rights. 
19. One might quibble with Cole for talking about race- and class-based inequalities in 
the same breath, as though they were constitutionally indistinguishable. After all, it might be 
argued, the Court has long subjected racial discrimination to heightened scrutiny, see, e.g., 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 {1944), but has not afforded the same scrutiny to 
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unexamined or untarnished. The pervasiveness of race. and class bias 
produces, for example, spurious consent searches (pp. 27-34); pretex­
tual motorist stops based upon race-stereotyped profiling (pp. 34-41); 
woefully incompetent, overburdened, and underpaid defense counsel, 
even in capital cases (pp. 76-89); drug laws with markedly disparate ra­
cial impacts (pp. 141-46); and all-white juries resulting from selection 
practices that exclude minorities (pp. 115-23). Cole subjects all of 
these practices to unrelenting scrutiny. According to Cole, when they 
are challenged separately in litigation, the Supreme Court either looks 
the other way or acknowledges the mandate of equality with a wink 
and a nod while ultimately failing to enforce that mandate.20 
Cole offers several insights into how the Supreme Court's criminal 
decisions, especially those of the Rehnquist Court, have solidified the 
inequalities he identifies. He charges that "[b ]y exploiting society's 
'background' inequality, the Court sidesteps the difficult question of 
how much constitutional protection we could afford if we were willing 
to ensure that it was enjoyed equally by all people" (p. 7). As an illus­
tration of this background inequality, Cole cites "a predominantly 
white Congress [that] has mandated prison sentences for the posses­
sion and distribution of crack cocaine one hundred times more severe 
than the penalties for powder cocaine" (p. 8). This mandate has had a 
disparate racial impact, since blacks constitute 90% of crack convic­
tions but only 20% of powder convictions (p. 8). Cole demonstrates 
that the sentencing law's impact on African-American defendants is 
discrimination based on wealth or class, see, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) 
("[T]his Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes 
of equal protection analysis."); San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 
{1973) ("[A]t least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require 
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. "). While some of the inequalities on which 
Cole focuses concern race-based discrimination (like traffic stops of black motorists), others 
are inequalities that affect people of limited means (such as the inadequate representation 
generally afforded to indigent criminal defendants). In defense of Cole's approach, however, 
it might be pointed out that the Court has insisted that class-based discrimination is every bit 
as noxious as race-based discrimination. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351U.S.12, 17 (1956) 
{plurality opinion of Black, J.) ("In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on ac­
count of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color."). Whether it has actually en­
forced this principle is, of course, another story - and Cole's book does a nice job of dem­
onstrating that the Court has not done a particularly good job of policing either race- or 
class-based inequality in the administration of criminal justice. While Cole could perhaps 
have been clearer in separating out race-based and class-based inequalities, one of No Equal 
Justice's principal themes is that these inequalities are so closely linked as to make it almost 
meaningless to draw an analytic distinction between the two. In any event, as stated above, 
our focus in this Review is principally upon racial rather than class inequities. 
20. See, e.g., pp. 41-42, 73-76, 76-81, 158-61, 161-65; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 
{1996) (upholding traffic stop of two black men despite officers' admission that they had no 
interest in enforcing traffic law) (discussed at pp. 39-40); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
{1987) (upholding Georgia's imposition of death penalty despite statistical evidence that de­
fendants charged with killing white victims received death penalty eleven times more often 
than defendants charged with killing black victims) {pp. 132-41); City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that black man seeking to challenge LAPD's use of 
chokehold lacks standing) {pp. 161-63). 
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magnified by prosecutors' decisions of whom to charge. According to 
U.S. Sentencing Commission data, 65% of crack cocaine users are 
white;21 yet in 1992, 92.6% of those convicted for crack-related crimes 
were African American and only 4.1 % were white (p. 142). Cole also 
discusses the alarmingly high rate of black incarceration, showing that, 
if the nationwide incarceration rate for whites were the same as the 
rate for blacks, "more than 3.5 million white people would be incar­
cerated today, instead of 570,000, and we would need more than three 
times the prison capacity (and prosecution and court capacity) that we 
currently have" (pp. 151-52). 
Such disparities in prosecution and incarceration have evaded con­
stitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, because 
challengers must prove that prosecutors, legislators, or jurors intended 
to discriminate, an almost insuperable obstacle.22 Cole argues that 
these disparities - regardless of whether invidious intent can be 
proven - threaten the very legitimacy of our criminal justice system. 
He therefore takes issue with those who, in Cole's words, "argue that 
as long as we can rid the criminal justice system of explicit and inten­
tional considerations of race, we will have solved the problem of ine­
quality in criminal justice."23 
The statistics and anecdotes that Cole collects paint a startling por­
trait of a criminal justice system that - whether by design or not -
metes out disproportionately harsh treatment to racial minorities, es­
pecially those who are also disadvantaged by poverty. This evidence 
makes it difficult to argue with Cole's thesis that racial justice cannot 
be obtained simply by "banning intentional racism from the system" 
(p. 10), at least as the Supreme Court has generally conceived of "in­
tentional racism." But what would be required for our system to 
achieve this equality ideal, or at least to move closer to it? Although 
Cole's book, as we shall explain, does not provide as clear an answer 
to this overarching question as one might like, his portrait of the 
criminal justice system strongly suggests that wholesale reevaluation of 
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to criminal justice is in 
order. 
The most compelling part of No Equal Justice is Cole's sharp-eyed 
analysis of how the federal judiciary, and especially the Supreme 
Court, has facilitated and reinforced racial inequality that occurs at the 
21. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 39, 161 {1995). 
22. See infra, Sections III.B-C. 
23. Cole cites Randall Kennedy as exemplifying this view. P. 9. See, e.g., RANDALL 
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 11 {1997) ("in the absence of persuasive proof that 
a law was enacted for the purpose of treating one racial group differently than another .. . 
courts should permit elected policymakers to determine what is in the best interests of their 
constituents."). 
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street level. Cole's thorough discussion of the jurisprudence around 
profile-driven stops and arrests is particularly troubling. Here, he pro­
vides a shocking list of traits judicially upheld as part of a drug-courier 
profile: for example, the suspect "acted too nervous," he "acted too 
calm"; the suspect "arrived late at night," he "arrived early in the 
morning," he "arrived in afternoon"; the suspect "made eye contact 
with officer," he "avoided eye contact with officer"; the suspect was 
"one of first to deplane," he was "one of last to deplane," he "de­
planed in the middle"; the suspect "traveled alone," he "traveled with 
a companion," and so on (pp. 48-49). Cole convincingly argues that, 
because "unguided discretion invites stereotyped judgments," such 
wildly expansive criteria are perfectly set up to "be used dispropor­
tionately against minorities" (pp. 51-52). He even points to cases in 
which courts have expressly held or suggested that stops will survive 
equal protection scrutiny even where race is a factor, so long as it is 
not the sole factor (p. 51 ). But the alternative to using race as a 
ground for suspicion, routinely stopping "well-to-do white people" in 
the same way that minorities are stopped, would result in "community 
pressure on the police to regulate themselves" (p. 54). The ultimate 
consequence, Cole persuasively argues, would be too few stops and, 
necessarily, too few arrests for the satisfaction of either law enforce­
ment or the majority (p. 52). 
Even Gideon's trumpet has been muted. What the Supreme Court 
once gave indigent defendants by holding that the Sixth and Four­
teenth Amendments required appointment of defense counsel for the 
poor24 has since been covertly taken away by judicial countenancing of 
grossly understaffed, underresourced, and overburdened public de­
fender offices.25 To the same end, Cole cites a 1986 study finding that, 
in the State of New York, 75% of appointed counsel in homicide 
cases, and 82% in nonhomicide cases, failed to interview their clients 
or to conduct serious investigations (p. 86). States cap per-case 
spending by appointed lawyers at levels precluding competent repre­
sentation without fear of court reproval: for example, $350 for felo­
nies in Virginia, $750 in South Carolina, and $1000 in Tennessee and 
Kentucky (pp. 83-84). Despite the fact that prosecutors are not sub­
ject to per-case spending limits and are generally funded much more 
generously, courts have mostly upheld these caps (pp. 82-88). And be­
cause black and Hispanic defendants bear a disproportionate share of 
24. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1 963). 
25. As examples, Cole cites the public defenders' office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
wherein public defenders are individually responsible for 1000 to 1 200 misdemeanor cases 
per year, and the office in Fulton County, Georgia, in which public defenders handle over 
500 felonies annually along with other cases. Seep. 83. 
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the burden (pp. 94-95), there is little public pressure to raise or abolish 
these caps.26 
To make matters worse, Cole explains, the Supreme Court has 
constructed a test for proving ineffective assistance of counsel so de­
manding that it is "virtually impossible to meet."27 Cole catalogs ap­
pellate rulings upholding convictions of indigent defendants against 
claims of inadequate defense where counsel fell asleep, were intoxi­
cated, used cocaine, and even were absent during critical testimony at 
their clients' trials (pp. 78-81). Though the rich would not put up with 
such lawyering, the Court's decisions leave the poor with no alterna­
tive. As Cole concludes, "[f]or all practical purposes, [the poor person 
facing criminal charges] has only the right to be represented by an in­
dividual admitted to the bar" (p. 76). Perhaps the greatest irony is 
that, while Supreme Court precedent nominally requires appointment 
of a competent attorney, "when an attorney demonstrates competence 
and dedication to his clients, he can find it difficult to get appointed 
for precisely that reason" (p. 88). Cole describes cases in which expe­
rienced capital defense lawyers prevail in federal habeas proceedings, 
only to have state judges deny them the opportunity to represent their 
clients when the cases return for retrial (p. 88).28 
Taken as a whole, Cole's book presents a vivid and unsettling pic­
ture of a criminal system that is failing to live up to its promise of 
equal justice, especially for racial minorities. He makes a convincing 
case that Supreme Court decisions have perpetuated these inequali­
ties, and that the public's lack of trust in our criminal justice system -
particularly in minority communities - can be traced to the Court's 
unwillingness to take on responsibility for policing racial discrimina­
tion in the administration of criminal justice. 
26. There exists a rich body of social science literature documenting that, despite the 
decline of overt and conscious racism, there is still a vast racial divide on a variety of public 
policy issues. See, e.g., DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: 
RACIAL POLmCS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 12-34 {1996); Lawrence Bobo, Race Public 
Opinion and the Social Sphere, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 {1997). For one study of the extent to 
which white stereotypes about African Americans influence public opinion on criminal jus­
tice, see Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of 
Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375 {1997) {finding that "much of public opinion • . .  is 
influenced by racial concerns"); see also Mary Beth Oliver, Caucasian Viewers' Memory of 
Black and White Criminal Suspects in the News, 49 J. COMM. 46 (1999) (finding that in news­
casts, Caucasian viewers were likely to misidentify Caucasian suspects as African-American). 
27. P. 78. Cole is referring to the standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 {1984), which requires that the defendant show a "reasonable probability that the 
result would have been different" but for the attorney's deficient performance. 
28. In one such case, an attorney from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund prevailed in a federal habeas proceeding, but was denied the opportunity to represent 
his client on retrial, when the case was sent back to a local judge in Fayette County, Georgia. 
P. 88 (citing Roberts v. State, 438 S.E.2d 90 5,  90 6 (Ga. 1994)). The explanation Cole pro­
vides for such alarming rulings is that "capable defense attorneys can make a trial judge's life 
difficult," p. 89, especially in capital cases. 
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III. THE LARGER PICTURE 
Drawing such a strong connection between racial inequalities and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence is obviously a very serious matter, one 
that commands attention. Cole relies on a combination of statistical 
and anecdotal evidence in bringing to light the savage inequalities that 
pervade our criminal justice system. By juxtaposing street-level de­
scriptions of how criminal laws are enforced with Supreme Court deci­
sions involving various aspects of the criminal justice system (e.g., de­
tentions, arrests, adequacy of counsel, prosecutorial discretion, juror 
selection), Cole argues that the rulings of the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts have locked in the impact of existing inequities. Thus, central 
to his story are such cases as City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,29 McCleskey 
v. Kemp,30 Whren v. United States,31 and United States v. Armstrong,32 
all of which insulate the criminal justice system from claims of race­
based discrimination. 
While these cases help explain some of the persistent inequalities 
in the judicial system, there exists a larger and more dominant story. 
The principal opinions clearing the way for systemic discrimination are 
not found in prosecutors' or defense attorneys' briefs. They are not 
bedrock law upon which the criminal justice system is built. The deci­
sions that Cole so critically describes, from McCleskey to Armstrong, 
are instead the consequence of the misguided paradigm to which the 
Court has adhered - since at least the mid-1970s - in assessing 
claims asserting the denial of equal protection. Rather than examining 
whether a government entity as a whole has discriminated, the Court 
has insisted upon an inquiry that requires equal protection plaintiffs to 
ferret out individual, intentional discriminators. Put another way, the 
Court has insisted upon a "bad apple" paradigm instead of examining, 
to borrow a term from criminal procedure, whether the tree itself is 
poisoned.33 
A. Uprooting the Poisonous Tree: Brown and Green 
Perhaps the most telling way to begin an examination of how we 
have reached the point where the criminal justice system could sys­
temically discriminate on the basis of race, yet remain impervious to 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge, is to ask this question: Why does 
29. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
30. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
31. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
32. 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
33. The term "fruit of the poisonous tree" was coined in Nardone v. United States, 308 
U.S. 338, 341 (1939), and refers to the doctrine that evidence obtained as the result of illegal 
government action is "tainted" and should therefore be excluded. 
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Brown v. Board of Education34 seem so utterly irrelevant to a discus­
sion of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system? Or why, 
close to fifty years after that decision, does the question itself sound 
off-kilter? 
The Court in Brown stated that it "must look ... to the effect of 
segregation itself on public education"35 to determine whether school 
systems were denying equal protection of law. The Brown Court, of 
course, did not rest its analysis on whether there were individual bad 
actors on school boards who intended to disadvantage blacks - al­
though it certainly could have chosen to rely on the intent of many 
segregationists to deny equality to blacks.36 Instead, the Brown Court 
focused on the fact that a system of separate public schools for blacks 
and whites "generates a feeling of inferiority" among black children 
"as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."37 The Court thereafter 
insisted, in Green v. County School Board, that school segregation fos­
tered by government must be eliminated "root and branch."38 
On the surface at least, it would seem a short step to transport the 
precepts of Brown and Green to the criminal justice system, where the 
elimination of racial inequality would surely be no less essential. If the 
evidence contained in Cole's book is any indication, many aspects of 
our criminal justice system would arguably flunk the test applied by 
the Brown Court. Take, for example, Cole's description of Maryland 
state police detaining a disproportionate number of African-American 
motorists - a phenomenon increasingly referred to as "Driving While 
Black or Brown."39 According to one survey that Cole cites, 70% of 
those stopped on Interstate 95 were black, although only 17.5% of 
speeders on that highway were black (p. 36). It might well be difficult 
to show that any individual trooper had the conscious intent to stop 
motorists simply because of their skin color. But assuming that these 
statistics are accµrate, a Brown-type analysis would seem to support 
the conclusion that Maryland's system of policing its highways violates 
Equal Protection regardless of whether a particular motorist can show 
that a particular trooper was motivated by discriminatory intent. To 
borrow Brown's terms, a policing system that confers the "sanction of 
34. 347 U.S. 463 (1954). 
35. Id. at 492. 
36. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 367-95 (1996). 
37. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
38. 391 U.S. 430 , 438 (1968). 
39. See, e.g., Yancey Roy, Recent Cases Put Racial Profiling in Spotlight, Gannett News 
Serv., Feb. 28, 20 00 , at ARC, available in LEXIS, News Library, GNS File ("Racial profiling 
is old news in the black community where it's often referred to as 'DWB,' driving while 
black."). A Lexis search of news stories found hundreds that have used the term "Driving 
While Black" over the past two years. 
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the law" upon policing practices that disproportionately target African 
Americans can only create a "sense of inferiority" among the group 
that is so targeted.40 And, following Green, the duty of law enforce­
ment agencies under these circumstances would be to eliminate the 
discriminatory practices "root and branch." 
B. The Paradigm Shifts: Keyes, Davis, and Arlington Heights 
One can perhaps argue with the conclusion that the social meaning 
of police stops that disproportionately target blacks is to stamp them 
as inferior. But what is surprising, at least at first blush, is that we 
have not even seen challenges following this line of argument. To un­
derstand why that is the case, it is necessary to look beyond the 
Court's decisions in the area of criminal justice. Doing so reveals that 
the Court's blindness to race- and class-based injustice within the 
criminal justice system is a product of the paradigm that the Court has 
relied upon in assessing equal protection claims in noncriminal cases. 
Explaining why the criminal justice system has not proven susceptible 
to such challenges thus requires inquiry outside the criminal justice 
system. 
Again, the Court's school desegregation cases offer the most fruit­
ful point of departure. Brown and its immediate progeny41 represent 
the zenith of the "poisonous tree" paradigm - the recognition that, 
irrespective of evidence regarding the motives of individual malefac­
tors, a governmental system may deny equality to a particular group 
through the sum of its operations. In these cases, the Court refused to 
accept formal equal treatment and absence of the intent to discrimi­
nate as proof that equal protection had been accorded; these opinions 
instead examined whether, on the whole, the effect of the school sys­
tem was to "deprive the children of the minority group of equal educa­
tional opportunities. "42 
In the 1970s, however, the paradigm shifted. Even as the Court 
continued to require school boards to remedy their own intentional 
segregation, it retreated from its earlier emphasis on investigating the 
systemic effects of governmental action. In Keyes v. School District 
No. 1,43 the Court announced its intent to examine "intentionally seg­
regative school board actions" as the litmus test for compliance with 
the Equal Protection Clause. Four years later, in Dayton Board of 
Education v. Brinkman,44 the Court firmly established that "[t]he 
40. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting finding in the Kansas case). 
41. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 
U.S. 683 (1963). 
42. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
43. 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). 
44. 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
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finding that the pupil population in the various Dayton schools is not 
homogeneous, standing by itself, is not a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the absence of a showing that this condition resulted 
from intentional segregative action on the part of the Board."45 
The Court thereby refused to allow the federal judiciary to take re­
sponsibility for systems that produce or reproduce inequality, absent 
some intentional bad actor. To be sure, the Court's subsequent deci­
sions continue to echo Green's admonition that, where discrimination 
has been found to exist, government must eliminate it "root and 
branch."46 By the mid-1970s, however, this seemingly awesome obliga­
tion had been stripped of its original meaning. The Court had by then 
abandoned Brown's insistence on looking to systemic discrimination 
- assessing whether the tree had been poisoned so badly as to require 
its elimination root and branch. This denied the Green mandate much 
of its force since, in the Court's view, there was no longer any tree to 
uproot, but simply "bad apples" to be picked off. 
This doctrinal shift actually is best evinced by the Court's decision 
in Washington v. Davis.41 In Davis, the Court upheld Washington, 
D.C.'s hiring practices for its police force. To get on the force, appli­
cants were required to take a qualifying test, which blacks failed much 
more often than whites. The Court rejected the argument that such a 
disparate impact on blacks was sufficient to show an equal protection 
violation. The Court stated that "[t]he central purpose of [equal pro­
tection is] the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the ba­
sis of race."48 Taking this statement on its face, it might seem that a 
system riddled with racial discrimination - like the criminal justice 
system that Cole depicts - ought to be an easy mark for a Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge. But the Davis Court followed this sweeping 
statement with a narrow definition of what would be considered "offi­
cial conduct discriminating on the basis of race.''49 
Much has already been written on both sides regarding Davis's 
holding that it is a "basic equal protection principle that the invidious 
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately 
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."50 Whether or not one 
45. Id. at 413. 
46. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 486 (1992) (quoting Green v. County School 
Bd., 391U.S.430, 438 (1968))  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
48. Id. at 239. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 240; accord, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: 
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1076 (1979) (arguing that not 
requiring discriminatory intent would be "neither workable nor desirable"); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320-21 (1987) (criticizing discriminatory purpose doctrine articulated 
in Davis). 
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agrees that discriminatory purpose should really be considered a basic 
equal protection principle, what is noteworthy about Davis is the ab­
sence of any consideration of the actual dynamics by which discrimina­
tion takes place in connection with the workings of government. 
Questions about the nature of discrimination are not even raised. In­
stead, the Court in effect assumes the answers, citing as examples of 
official discrimination Jim Crow segregation in public schools or facili­
ties, the acts of individual government officers like prosecutors or jury 
commissioners in relation to particular cases, or a pattern of conduct 
by the same official. Neither identified nor acknowledged is the possi­
bility that official discrimination could also be revealed in the aggre­
gate of an entire system's functioning, through the conduct of a multi­
tude of government actors, operating in separate and distinct cases and 
very likely not even aware of each other's actions. Can there exist, for 
example, an ethos of pervasive racial discrimination throughout a gov­
ernmental system, perhaps owing to the same sorts of underlying dis­
criminatory attitudes among individuals, but undetectable if the in­
quiry is focused upon a single actor or incident?51 
One year after Davis, the Court, in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,52 even more conclusively 
ruled out, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, a thoroughgoing in­
vestigation into pervasive racial discrimination. There, the Court set 
out as probative sources of discriminatory intent a set of criteria incon­
sistent with a systemwide model of official discriminatory behavior. 
The Court abandoned any pretense of inquiring into the overall im­
pact of a system's functioning upon people of a particular race. In­
stead, the Court focused on criteria like "[t]he specific sequence of 
events leading up to the challenged decision," "[d]epartures from the 
normal procedural sequence," "[s]ubstantive departures ... if the fac­
tors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor 
a decision contrary to the one reached," or the "legislative or adminis­
trative history behind a particular official action"53 - criteria that 
sharply limited the field to a single event and to decisionmakers di­
rectly responsible for that unitary conduct. 
The Court's skepticism toward race-conscious affirmative action, 
starting with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,54 graphi­
cally illustrates this paradigm shift. By 1978, the Court had come full 
circle from suggesting that government has a responsibility to root out 
racial segregation, to forbidding it from attempting to desegregate its 
51. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 50, at 327 ("[A] legal theory that seeks to remove ra­
cial prejudice from governmental decisionmaking must acknowledge and incorporate what is 
known about unconscious motivation."). 
52. 429 U.S. 252 {1977). 
53. Id. at 267-68. 
54. 438 U.S. 265 {1978). 
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universities, absent a compelling justification. In Bakke, five Justices 
rejected a set-aside for minority applicants to U.C. Davis Medical 
School.55 They did so over the objection of four dissenters who argued 
that the goal of "remedying the effects of past societal discrimination" 
sufficed to justify race-conscious admissions benefiting minorities.56 
Rejecting this view, Justice Powell, the swing vote, stated that race­
conscious university admissions could only be upheld if they satisfied 
"the most exacting judicial examination."57 
By the late 1970s, then, the Court had not simply abandoned its en­
terprise of rooting out systemic discrimination, but had actually turned 
its attention to eliminating voluntary programs designed to uproot sys­
temic discrimination. Absent an explicit racial distinction or an inten­
tional bad actor, no equal protection violation would be found. So re­
structured, the Court's test for what counts as racial discrimination can 
rarely get past individual cases to be treated on their individual facts. 
C. The Bad Apple Paradigm Applied to Criminal Cases 
Dayton, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Bakke paved the way for 
McCleskey v. Kemp.58 Cole correctly states that McCleskey "may be 
the single most important decision the Court has ever issued on the 
subject of race and crime" (p. 137). In fact, Cole need not have in­
serted the qualifying "may" since McCleskey, more so than any other 
case, exemplifies Cole's view of what is wrong with the Court's crimi­
nal jurisprudence and is appropriately the centerpiece of No Equal 
Justice. But as important a decision as McCleskey is in the area of 
criminal justice, it would be wrong to view this case as a striking depar­
ture from precedent. In fact, McCleskey's holding and rationale are 
the logical consequence of the Court's abandonment of the "poisonous 
tree" paradigm it had adopted in Brown, in favor of the "bad apple" 
paradigm that the Court had embraced by the time of Davis. 
McCleskey's counsel, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, mounted a 
sophisticated statistical challenge by demonstrating the disparity in the 
imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the murder vic­
tim's race and, secondarily, on the defendant's race. Iowa Law Profes­
sor David Baldus supervised the examination of more than 2400 
55. Id. at 319-20 (Powell, J.), 421 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C. J. and Stewart & 
Rehnquist, JJ.). 
56. Id. at 362 Goint opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, J J.). 
57. Id. at 291 (Powell, J.); see also id. at 310 (Powell, J.) ("[T]he purpose of helping cer­
tain groups whom the faculty . . .  perceived as victims of 'societal discrimination' does not 
justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no 
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are 
thought to have suffered."). 
58. 481U.S. 279 (1987). 
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criminal homicide cases in Georgia from 1973 to 1980. His investiga­
tors, using questionnaires sometimes as long as 120 pages, scrutinized 
police reports, parole board records, and prison files, ultimately cate­
gorizing more than 400 features of each case. Relying upon rigorous 
statistical analysis, Baldus and his colleagues sought to sequester those 
variables that accounted for which homicide defendants were receiv­
ing death sentences and, specifically, to determine the significance of 
race in the decisionmaking process of capital cases in Georgia. The 
study concluded that murderers of white victims were 4.3 times as 
likely to receive the death penalty as murderers of blacks, even after 
controlling for more than 230 variables arguably responsible for the 
disparity.59 What distinguished McCleskey's case from the typical 
case, therefore, was that it was not readily distinguishable. His fate 
was the fate of others convicted of murdering white individuals, and, 
instead of the result of one decisionmaker, it was the outcome of con­
scious and unconscious attitudes held perhaps by police, prosecutors, 
and even jurors in a multitude of separate cases. His story could not 
be seen in isolation; it was part of how the Georgia criminal justice sys­
tem regularly functioned. 
The Court rejected the challenge, holding that "[a]t most, the 
Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with 
race."60 It noted that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an 
inevitable part of our criminal justice system,"61 finding that 
[i]n light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the [ crimi­
nal] process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice 
system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defen­
dants . . .  the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally sig­
nificant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing proc­
ess.62 
In a footnote, the only safeguards mentioned were constitutional bans 
against "prosecutorial discretion ... exercised on the basis of race," 
"prosecutor[ial] exercise [of] peremptory challenges on the basis of 
race," and "efforts to exclude blacks from grand and petit juries."63 
While the Court devoted serious effort to this explanation, the 
concluding section of the majority opinion elucidated the Court's real 
problem with McCleskey's argument. Correctly pointing out that, "if 
we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly 
tainted the capital sentencing decision, we would soon be faced with 
59. See id. at287. 
60. Id. at 312. 
61 . Id. {foo tnote omi tted). 
62. Id. at 313 (foo tnote omi tted). 
63. Id. a t  309 n.30. 
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similar claims as to other types of penalty,"64 it held that "[t]he 
Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable 
disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor [such as 
race] in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital 
punishment."65 In other words, a statistical showing that a state's 
system operated as an entity to disadvantage minorities would always 
fail to prove a constitutional violation in a particular case. Though 
never admitted, systemic discrimination was treated as either 
nonexistent or outside the boundaries of the Constitution. As the 
Court summed up, "[ d]espite McCleskey's wide-ranging arguments 
that basically challenge the validity of capital punishment in our multi­
racial society, the only question before us is whether in his case, the 
law of Georgia was properly applied."66 If McCleskey's arguments 
regarding capital punishment are deemed too "wide-ranging" to be 
taking seriously by the Court, then the workings of the whole system 
can scarcely be considered a fit subject for serious constitutional 
review. 
While the latter part of the Mccleskey opinion exposed the Court's 
underlying concerns, a recent disclosure of an internal memorandum 
authored by Justice Scalia is even more starkly revealing.67 Although 
Justice Scalia joined the majority, this memorandum reveals that he 
was just as aware as the dissenters of the staggering implications of the 
Baldus study - though, unlike the dissenters, he was unwilling to have 
the federal courts to take on the weighty responsibility of rooting out 
racial prejudice from the criminal justice system. As related by 
Edward Lazarus, a law clerk to Justice Blackmun during the term the 
case was decided, Justice Scalia stated in a January 6, 1987 
memorandum following oral argument that "[s]ince it is my view . . 
that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and 
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) 
prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this 
court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more 
proof."68 These sentiments never explicitly made it into the majority 
opinion. But the message surely did: Even if systemic discrimination 
within our criminal justice processes exists, the Court must leave it 
untouched - as though the Constitution itself demanded that such 
64. Id. at 315 (citation omitted). The Court in fact cited "[s]tudies [that] already exist 
that allegedly demonstrate a racial disparity in the length of prison sentences." Id. at 315 
n.38. 
65. Id. at 319. 
66. Id. (citation omitted). 
67. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT 
OF THE EPIC STRUGGLE INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 211 (1998) (quoting untitled Scalia 
memorandum). 
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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discrimination remain invisible or, at the very least, be defined as 
something other than discrimination. 
D. Racial Justice Through Darkened Glasses 
Cole's illustrations serve to emphasize that the problem with ex­
isting constitutional doctrine, as constructed by the Court since the 
1970s, is that it is structurally incapable of reaching racial discrimina­
tion where it is most pernicious, penetrating throughout the entirety of 
a system. As Justice Brennan observed in his McCleskey dissent, the 
Court's fear was precisely that ruling in McCleskey's favor would lead 
to "too much justice"69 - or, more accurately, that it would impose on 
the federal courts the awesome responsibility of uprooting too much 
injustice, a burden that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have been 
unwilling to take on, and perhaps believe the federal judiciary to be 
incapable of handling.70 
What Cole does not say, but what his portrait of the criminal jus­
tice system reveals, is that the Court's equal protection methodology is 
the direct result of the paradigm constructed through Davis, Arlington 
Heights, and post-Brown school desegregation cases. The "too much 
justice" concern that Justice Brennan decried was not born in 
McCleskey. It is, rather, the product of the Court's decisions of the 
mid-1970s - particularly in the area of desegregation - that eschew a 
search for systemic discrimination and instead force equal protection 
claimants to identify with specificity the individual discriminators. As 
we have explained, the narrow approach that the Court has adopted in 
examining claims of inequality within the criminal justice system fol­
lowed from a doctrinal structure developed in noncriminal cases, 
which shielded bureaucratic processes that systematically disadvantage 
minorities from careful review. 
69. McCleskey, 481 U.S. a t  339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
70. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, has frequently expressed his view tha t the fed­
eral judiciary is already far too overburdened, especially by criminal cases. See, e.g., Chief 
Justice William H. Rehnquis t, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 
WIS. L. REV. 1; William H. Rehnquis t, The 1998 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 
THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1999, a t  1, 2 ("The number of cases brough t to the federal cour ts 
is one of the mos t serious problems facing them today."). He has expressed approval of 
measures tha t limi t access to cour ts by criminal defendants and prisoners, while a t  the same 
time decrying Congress's expansion of the federal courts' criminal docke t by federalizing 
more and more crimes. In his 1997 Year-End Report on the Judiciary, for example, the Chief 
Justice spoke of the Anti terrorism and Effective Dea th Penalty Ac t and the Prison Li tiga tion 
Reform Ac t, which limi ted habeas procedures and prisoner civil rights ac tions, as "promising 
examples of how Congress can reduce the disparity be tween the resources and workload in 
the federal Judiciary withou t endangering its distinctive charac ter." William H. Rehnquis t, 
The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1998, a t  1, 2. 
In the same repor t, the Chief Justice chastised Congress for its repea ted "desire to federalize 
new crimes." Id. 
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Viewed in this light, several other cases on which Cole focuses ap­
pear less remarkable than the cases that precede them. Take, for ex­
ample, Whren v. United States,11 in which a unanimous Court upheld 
the District of Columbia police officers' stop of two black men in a ve­
hicle, based on violations of the traffic code, even though the officers 
in question were barred from enforcing traffic laws unless they ob­
served an immediate safety threat.72 The men stopped had argued that 
the Court should construct a test that allows for inquiry into whether 
the stops were actually made based upon some ulterior motive. The 
Court, however, held that the officers' intent could not be used to es­
tablish a Fourth Amendment violation - even when the ostensible 
reason for the stop is "actual and admitted pretext.m3 It proceeded to 
hold that the deviation from usual police practices cannot be used to 
show a Fourth Amendment violation.74 Instead, the Court articulated 
a bright-line "objective" test - namely, whether there is probable 
cause for believing there to be a violation of any vehicle code section.75 
Cole is certainly correct to argue that the subtext to Whren, men­
tioned only briefly by the Court, is race-motivated stops. Whren had 
argued for a subjective intent test, in order to prevent those stops in 
which race is really what is motivating the stop. As Cole describes 
Whren, it stands for the proposition that even "a racially motivated 
pretextual stop is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment" (p. 39). 
While this characterization of Whren is technically accurate, the 
real story here is the two-part "divide-and-conquer" approach that the 
Court has generally adopted for issues of equality and liberty in the 
criminal justice system. First, as previously discussed, the Court has 
adhered to a constricting paradigm under the Equal Protection Clause 
that makes it almost impossible to show race- or ethnicity-based dis­
crimination, much less class-based discrimination.76 Except in that rare 
(and practically unheard of) case in which an officer admits that she or 
he made a traffic stop because of the driver's skin color, proving an 
equal protection violation is an almost unattainable task. Second, the 
standard that the Court has erected to determine whether liberty has 
been denied - in this case, the requirement that there have been no 
traffic infraction, even in cases in which this infraction was an "actual 
and admitted pretext" for the stop77 - makes it practically impossible 
to prove a violation. As Whren illustrates, traffic stops will survive 
71. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
72. See id. at 808-10, 816-17. 
73. Id. at 814 (emphasis omitted). 
74. See id. at 814-15. 
75. See id. at 819. 
76. See supra Section 111.B. 
77. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (emphasis omitted). 
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Fourth Amendment scrutiny, no matter how clear the evidence that 
the stop is pretextual, so long as there was a broken taillight, an unfas­
tened seat belt, or any other reason for stopping the vehicle. 
Whren, therefore, is less significant than the Court's more general 
insistence on looking separately at claimed Equal Protection Clause 
and Fourth Amendment violations, instead of inquiring how these 
clauses might work together. The same is true of many of the other 
areas of the criminal justice system that Cole describes. For instance, 
in examining the composition of juries, the Court has separated out 
the equal protection and "fair cross section" requirements, rather than 
examining how these requirements might work together. As Cole 
points out, "prosecutors should always be able to proffer some race­
neutral reasons for their [peremptory] strikes" (p. 122). It does not 
require an unusually savvy prosecutor to come up with such a ration­
ale and thereby to rebut a claim that equal protection has been denied. 
So, too, in the area of punishment, the Court separates out the "cruel 
and unusual punishment" requirement from the command of equal 
protection, thereby allowing punishment systems in which the race of 
the victim - and sometimes the perpetrator - bears profoundly on 
the punishment meted out. 
Cole probably would not disagree with this assessment of the Su­
preme Court's view of race in the area of criminal law - in particular, 
that the federal courts' failure to address the race- and class-based in­
justices documented in No Equal Justice are the consequence of the 
constricting paradigm that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have 
generally embraced in considering matters of race. The next question, 
then, is what can be done to remedy this situation. Can the Court's 
blindness to race- and class-based injustices in the criminal system be 
cured, without wholesale reconstruction of the Court's equal protec­
tion methodology? 
IV. A REsTORATIVE VISION 
Cole does an admirable job of poring over statistical and anecdotal 
data showing persistent race and class disparities, a:p.d of connecting 
those disparities to individual decisions of the Supreme Court. While 
he makes a persuasive argument that several of these cases ought to 
have come out differently, and that our criminal justice system might 
look significantly different if they had, Cole does not endeavor to con­
nect decisions such as McCleskey to the constricting paradigm that the 
Court has adopted more generally with regard to matters of race. His 
decision not to do so is certainly understandable - after all, he al­
ready has bitten off quite a large topic as it is. But the consequence is 
that Cole's book fails to propose remedies that are up to the task of 
eliminating the race- and class-based inequities that his book so thor­
oughly catalogues. 
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A. Cole's Prescription 
The least satisfying part of Cole's book is the concluding chapter, 
entitled "Remedies" (pp. 181-212). Instead of suggesting a reforma­
tion of the way that we think about constitutional rights in the area of 
criminal justice, No Equal Justice ends with a series of modest meas­
ures. The recommendations proffered in this section tend to empha­
size communitarian instead of libertarian values. They include, for ex­
ample, avoiding exclusion of jurors by "requiring much more 
persuasive explanations for peremptory strikes" (p. 188), "reinforcing 
the community ties that deter crimes in the first place" (p. 190), 
"strengthen[ing] measures to keep children in school" (p. 192), and 
imposing "reintegrative shaming" penalties (pp. 195-201). 
This laundry list of potential changes that can feasibly be accom­
plished is discomfiting not so much because it contains bad ideas -
indeed, most of Cole's suggestions would surely improve our present 
system - but rather because they appear wholly inadequate to ad­
dress the systemic race- and class-based inequities to which Cole de­
votes the first 180 pages of his book. Cole's recommendations are, 
moreover, strikingly disconsonant with the portrait of the criminal jus­
tice system that he so meticulously paints. Simply put, the remedies 
Cole proposes offer little hope of eliminating race- and class-based 
discrimination within the criminal justice system. 
Cole argues that the "racial divide fostered and furthered by ine­
quality in criminal justice has contributed to a spiral of crime and de­
cay in the inner city, corroding the sense of belonging that encourages 
compliance with the criminal law" (p. 13). The factual predicate for 
this statement seems somewhat dated. Recent statistics show crime to 
be on the decline nationwide,78 even as the as the zeal to impose stiffer 
penalties on offenders continues unabated.79 But even assuming the 
truth of Cole's statement, the remedies that Cole offers at best deal 
78. See Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New York-Style 
Hardball, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al (noting pronounced decrease in crime rate na­
tionwide and in numerous major cities between 1991 and 1998); see also FEDERAL BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS JANUARY- JUNE 1999 (1999), <http://www. 
fbi.gov/ucr/ucr0699.pdf> (notiPg 10% decrease in serious crime reported by nation's law en­
forcement agencies in the first six months of 1999 compared to the first six months of previ­
ous year) (visited June 13, 2000). 
79. In California, for example, voters in the March, 2000 elections approved three tough­
on-crime initiatives by wide margins. Two of the measures (Propositions 18 and 19) expand 
the circumstances under which the death penalty can be imposed. See CALIFORNIA SEC'Y 
OF STATE, CALIFORNIA VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 32-33, 36-37 (2000). The other 
(Proposition 21) requires more juvenile offenders to be tried in adult courts, requires that 
certain juvenile offenders be held in adult correctional facilities, and increases penalties for 
"gang-related" crime, including the imposition of the death penalty for "gang-related" mur­
ders. See id. at 44-47. Propositions 18 and 19 both garnered over 70% of the popular vote, 
while Proposition 21 garnered 62.1 %.  See California Secretary of State, Election Returns, 
March 2000 Primary, <http://vote2000.ss.ca.gov/returns/prop/OO.htm> (visited June 13, 2000). 
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with the manifestation of the illness, which Cole describes as a break­
down in our sense of community. The solutions do not, for the most 
part, deal with the underlying malady in a criminal justice system that 
fosters and furthers racial inequality. 
B. Some Stronger Medicine 
How might our criminal justice system be reformed so as to honor 
the constitutional commandment of equality in the area of criminal 
justice? While Cole describes at great length various inequities in our 
criminal justice system as presently constructed, he does not provide 
an overarching theory of what our ideal should be. 
To borrow the title from a recent book on the Constitution and 
criminal procedure, one written from a very different perspective, it 
would benefit us to return to constitutional "first principles " in con­
structing this ideal.80 It is instructive to view Cole's approach to the 
criminal justice alongside the approach advocated by Akhil Amar in 
The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles. While 
Cole approaches the criminal justice system from the street-level up, 
Amar urges an approach that might be deemed its polar opposite. A 
constitutional theorist rather than a civil rights lawyer, Amar is less in­
terested in what actually happens in our criminal justice system than 
he is in the Constitution's text and history. Amar thus urges that we 
read the Constitution as "rooted in enduring values that Americans 
can recognize as our values," including "[t]ruth and the protection of 
innocence."81 Amar might have added to his list equality in the eyes of 
the law regardless of race or wealth, for this is surely one of the values 
that Americans recognize as their own, at least since the time of the 
Civil War Amendments.82 
Consistent with this approach, Amar has argued elsewhere that the 
"very meaning" of the rights embedded in the original Constitution 
was "subtly redefined" by the Civil War Amendments.83 As an exam­
ple, Amar describes how the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom 
of speech was refined by the Fourteenth Amendment's concern with 
racial equality: "The 1866 redefinition changed the central purpose 
and optimal 'due process' implementation of freedom of speech, 
80. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES (1997). 
81. Id. at 155. 
82 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n view 
of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is ill this country no superior, dominant, rul­
ing class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal 
before the law."). 
83. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 
1193, 1277 (1992). 
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making central certain types of speech that had previously been far 
more peripheral: religious speech, artistic speech and, most impor­
tantly, minority speech."84 
As Carol Steiker has argued, Amar may be faulted for valuing 
"first principles" a bit too much, overemphasizing the text and history 
of constitutional provisions while ignoring the sort of street-level ine­
qualities on which Cole focuses.85 But if Amar is guilty of focusing on 
first principles too much, then Cole might justifiably be accused of fo­
cusing on them too little. Put another way, Cole's analysis might bene­
fit from a bit more constitutional theory. 
To envision how our jurisprudence might be reconstructed to alle­
viate the inequalities that Cole describes, we should embrace Amar's 
suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment breathed new meaning 
into the rights guaranteed by the original Constitution.86 How else, af­
ter all, can we understand cases like Bolling v. Sharpe,'(;] which apply 
the requirement of equal protection to the federal government by way 
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, despite the fact that 
the Equal Protection Clause by its terms applies only to the states?88 
Therefore, we should read the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of 
racial equality alongside the liberty-protecting provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. For example, instead of engaging in a Fourth Amendment in­
quiry that is wholly separate from an Equal Protection Clause inquiry, 
as the Court does in Whren, we should inquire how these provisions 
complement and reinforce each other. 
Such a failure to combine "first principles" of the Bill of Rights and 
the Equal Protection Clause contributes to the Supreme Court's fail­
ure to recognize inequality in the criminal justice system. That failure 
can, as we have explained, be traced to the narrow approach it has 
generally taken in assessing equal protection claims. But whatever the 
faults of this approach, taking the command of equality seriously in 
the area of criminal justice would not necessarily require a wholesale 
84. Id. at 1282. 
85. Carol Steiker, "First Principles" of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Mistake?, 
112 HARV. L. REv. 680, 690 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 80). Steiker also persua­
sively argues that Amar fails to apply the principles he preaches. For example, she points 
out that, in First Principles, Amar "underplays the extent to which constitutional criminal 
procedure really is and should be about race, class, and equality." Id. at 693. Although 
Amar's earlier article, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, see Amar, supra 
note 83, argues in favor of an approach to the Bill of Rights that focuses on racial equality, 
First Principles generally eschews such an approach. 
86. See Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 83, at 1282 
(arguing that " 'freedom of speech' was subtly redefined in 1866"). 
87. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that equal protection principle applies to federal gov­
ernment by way of the Due Process Oause of the Fifth Amendment). 
88. See Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 83, at 1281-
84 (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment alters the meaning of the First Amendment as to 
the federal government as well as the states). 
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revision of the Court's Equal Protection Clause methodology. In­
stead, it would require a recognition that the command of equality has 
special weight in cases in which rights protected by the Bill of Rights, 
including those that apply to the criminal justice system, are impli­
cated. 
In addition to the practical realities on which Cole focuses, there is 
textual, historical, and theoretical support for an approach that gives 
special attention to the command of equality in the area of criminal 
procedure. The rights of criminal defendants were, of course, a domi­
nant concern of the Framers of the Constitution, provisions protecting 
these rights being embedded in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendments, not to mention the Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, and 
Habeas Corpus Clauses. Even more important, concerns regarding 
the equal implementation of state criminal laws were a dominant con­
cern at the time of the Civil War Amendments. The Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were especially wary of southern states de­
nying newly freed blacks through unequal administration of the crimi­
nal laws.89 
Even aside from constitutional text and history, there are compel­
ling theoretical reasons for the approach we urge. To the extent one 
views the purpose of constitutional law as correcting deficiencies in 
majoritarian democracy,90 claims of race- and class-based inequality in 
the criminal justice system have special force, for two complementary 
reasons. First, as Cole points out, if there is any group that is specially 
disadvantaged in the political process, it is criminal suspects and de­
fendants (p. 139). Given the "widespread societal hostility" toward 
those accused of criminal activity, the legislature can hardly be 
counted on to eliminate discriminatory practices in the criminal justice 
system.91 Second, even apart from the Constitution's special sensitivity 
to the rights of criminal defendants, Cole's book makes a convincing 
case that the rights of racial minorities generally, and not just actual 
defendants, are implicated by the practices he documents. It is com­
munities perceived by law enforcement to be criminal in character that 
bear the brunt of these practices - from the numerous African-
89. As Justice Blackmun observed in his McCleskey dissent "[T]he legislative history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment reminds us that discriminatory enforcement of States' criminal 
laws was a matter of great concern for the drafters." 481 U.S. at 346; see also id. at 346-47 & 
n.2 (quoting statements from legislative history of Fourteenth Amendml!nt); LEON 
LmVACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 285-86 (1979) 
("The double standard of white justice was nowhere clearer . . .  than in the disparate pun­
ishments meted out to whites and blacks convicted of similar crimes"); Randall L. Kennedy, 
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1388, 1411 (1988) ("In the aftermath of slavery, Southern officials continued to administer 
the death penalty, and indeed the entire apparatus of the criminal law, in a patently racist 
fashion"). 
90. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
91. See id. at 154. 
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American motorists stopped by Maryland state police who may never 
meet one another, to the innocent Latino immigrants wrongly con­
victed and imprisoned as the result of the LAPD's pattern and practice 
of misconduct in the Rampart Division. Minorities in the criminal jus­
tice system are thus disadvantaged in their ability to protect their in­
terests in the political process, further supporting the conclusion that 
courts should exercise especially searching review of practices that 
disproportionately burden minorities accused or suspected of violating 
criminal laws.92 
Of course, we need not all agree as a matter of constitutional the­
ory to reach the same conclusion. As Steiker points out, we can dis­
agree on how to interpret the Constitution - as, say, between histori­
cal and representation-reinforcement models - and still arrive at the 
same place: namely, that the provisions of the Constitution that pro­
tect criminal defendants should be construed, in light of the Four­
teenth Amendment, in a way that is particularly sensitive to racial in­
justice. 
Seen in this light, Cole's focus on communitarian remedies (pp. 
189-209) seems misplaced. Our real focus should be on reconciling 
egalitarianism and libertarianism - and, in particular, on how the 
liberty-protecting provisions of the Bill of Rights should be read so as 
to reinforce the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of equality. 
C. Envisioning Justice: The Case of Race-Based Traffic Stops 
Simply described, the approach we advocate is that, where substan­
tive rights protected by the Bill of Rights are at issue, courts should be 
especially attentive to racial discrimination. Taking this approach 
would be no small matter. It would require that the federal judiciary 
consider claims of those who have heretofore been denied standing, to 
reevaluate the evidentiary burden that those challenging discrimina­
tory practices must bear, and to absorb much greater responsibility for 
remedying inequality. As daunting as this might seem, we believe that 
the federal judiciary could take on greater responsibilities for securing 
equality in the area of criminal justice, without wholesale abandon­
ment of the equal protection methodology it has generally embraced 
in areas such as school desegregation. 
92. This partly explains why Cole's suggestions for political action in response to the 
inequalities he mentions, see pp. 188-201, seem somewhat quixotic. As Cole recognizes, 
"[I]egislators have little interest in protecting the rights of accused criminals. So if the judici­
ary doesn't protect them, nobody will." P. 139. If there is any area in which majoritarian 
bodies cannot be trusted to remedy inequality, it is in the area of criminal justice. For this 
reason, we argue, it is ultimately the federal courts, the institution of democracy charged 
with protecting the basic rights of the unpopular and powerless, that must take responsibility 
in this area. 
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Of course, there may well be good reasons for generally abandon­
ing the bad-apple model - both in criminal and in noncriminal cases 
- in favor of an approach that considers the disparate impact of an 
entire system on racial minorities.93 But one need not accept such a 
far-reaching argument to believe that the Court should change the way 
it looks at claims of racial inequality in the criminal arena. As we have 
argued, a higher standard in this arena is justifiable, based upon the 
principle that race discrimination is especially noxious where constitu­
tionally protected liberties are at issue. How would this principle play 
out in practice? As an initial matter, it would surely prescribe a differ­
ent result in several of the Supreme Court decisions that Cole dis­
cusses. For instance, in McCleskey v. Kemp, it would have required 
that the Court consider the interplay between McCleskey's Eighth 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Confronted with 
compelling evidence of systemwide racial disparities in the application 
of the most severe penalty possible, the Court might have shifted the 
burden to the state to come up with a race-neutral explanation for this 
disparity. In United States v. Armstrong, our approach would have re­
quired the Court to consider the interplay between the Fifth Amend­
ment right to "due process," the Sixth Amendment right to "compul­
sory process for obtaining witnesses in [the accused's] favor," and the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to "equal protection." What Armstrong 
was demanding, after all, was simply that the prosecutor be required to 
provide a nondiscriminatory explanation of the basis for the statistical 
disparity in crack prosecutions. Reading the liberty- and equality­
protecting clauses of the Constitution together would have compell�d 
the Court to give Armstrong the discovery needed to assess whether, 
consciously or unconsciously, the United States Attorney's office was 
in fact engaging in systemic race-based discrimination in deciding 
whom to prosecute. 
But the principle we identify would not simply call for more 
searching review of practices having a disparate racial impact. Our 
approach would also require reevaluation of existing constitutional 
doctrine in at least three respects: (1) assessing who has standing to 
bring challenges demanding systemic reform, (2) determining the evi­
dentiary standards applied to decide whether there is racial discrimina­
tion in the enforcement of criminal laws, and (3) crafting judicial 
remedies for systemic discrimination in the administration of criminal 
justice. Without revising each of the subjects that Cole's book covers, 
we shall attempt to illuminate this approach by focusing on race-based 
traffic stops by police. 
93. As our discussion in Part III supra suggests, we would favor such a revision. 
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1. Standing to Sue 
Ensuring nondiscrimination in traffic stops and other seizures re­
quires, as an initial matter, reconsideration of the rules that the Court 
has adopted for determining who gets into court. One of the problems 
that frequently bedevils civil rights lawyers seeking to reform even the 
most egregious police misconduct is finding anyone who has standing 
to seek injunctive relief. As it has done in other areas of criminal law, 
the Court has set the bar for standing so high that it is often unreach­
able, making it practically impossible for private plaintiffs to obtain 
injunctive relief. 
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,94 for example, the Supreme Court 
held that an African-American man seeking an injunction against the 
LAPD's use of the chokehold lacked standing. Although Lyons had 
allegedly been subjected to a chokehold without provocation, the 
Court held that he could not show "any real or immediate threat that 
[he] would be wronged again,"95 since he could not show an imminent 
threat that the LAPD would again use the chokehold on him 
personally. A recent en bane decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied Lyons to preclude plaintiffs from obtaining injunctive 
relief for alleged racial discrimination in traffic stops. More recently, 
in Rodgers-Durgin v. Lopez, Latino plaintiffs sued to stop the United 
States Border Patrol's alleged "systemic violations of the Fourth 
Amendment" resulting from its practice of stopping people of 
"Hispanic, Latin, or Mexican appearance."96 The court held that the 
named plaintiffs could not show a "sufficient likelihood" that they 
personally would be stopped again, and that, absent "a likelihood of 
injury to the named plaintiffs," no equitable relief could be issued on 
behalf of the class they sought to represent.97 
The Court's standing doctrine poses an awesome barrier to law­
suits challenging police practices, especially given Lyons's statement 
that, to seek equitable relief against a government entity, one must 
show that "all police officers" in a jurisdiction "always" engage in the 
purportedly illegal practice with those they encounter and that the ju­
risdiction "ordered or authorized police officers to act in such man­
ner."98 Our approach would demand that courts treat claims of dis­
criminatory traffic stops under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment with the same solicitude with which they have treated 
claims under the First Amendment. In the First Amendment context, 
94. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
95. Id. at 111. 
96. 799 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1999) (en bane). 
97. See id. at 1044. 
98. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106. 
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the Court has broadened generally applicable standing rules, in recog­
nition of the special problems posed by state action that has a chilling 
effect upon protected speech.99 It has allowed First Amendment chal­
lenges to practices that burden protected speech, by those whose 
speech might itself be unprotected.100 The Court has justified this ex­
ception to normal standing rules as "strong medicine" that is required 
because the "First Amendment needs breathing space."101 
Giving the same breathing space to the Fourth Amendment rights 
of minority motorists warrants comparable expansion of standing doc­
trine. Even if ordinary standing rules would require motorists to dem­
onstrate a likelihood of being stopped again, as Rodgers-Durgin held, 
motorists who have been stopped in the past should be granted stand­
ing to pursue injunctive relief, whether or not they can prove that they 
are likely to be stopped in the future. Crafting broader standing rules 
in this context would recognize the importance of protecting minority 
drivers who are not before the court, and who may refrain from driv­
ing into certain areas because of discriminatory police practices. At 
the very least, plaintiffs should be allowed into court where they allege 
a pattern and practice affecting a class of individuals whose interests 
they seek to represent. 
In this regard, First Amendment doctrine provides another apt 
comparison. As Justice Brennan explained, lenient standing rules in 
the First Amendment area can be justified by concerns that "persons 
whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from 
exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions."102 By the same 
token, absent judicial intervention, black motorists not before the 
Court might be deterred from driving into areas where police are 
known for making race-based stops. Accordingly, as in the First 
Amendment context, unconstitutional practices might otherwise 
flourish, because, under ordinary standing rules, there are few if any 
people who can get into court to assert that their rights have actually 
been violated. Affected individuals may simply choose to avoid con­
frontation with authorities, rather than running afoul of the law and 
then taking their chances in court. 
99. See, e.g., Secretary of State v. J.H. Munson Co,, 467 U.S. 947, 954-59 (1984). 
100. See id. at 957 ("[W]here the claim is that a statute is overly broad in violation of the 
First Amendment, the Court has allowed a party to assert the rights of another without re­
gard to the ability of the other to assert his own claims and with no requirement that the per­
son making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute 
drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.") (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
612 (1973) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
101. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611, 613 (1973). 
102. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972). 
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2. Evidentiary Standards 
Recognizing the interplay between the liberty-protecting Fourth 
Amendment and the equality-protecting Fourteenth Amendment 
would also affect the standards applied in assessing whether the gov­
ernment has acted in a discriminatory fashion. As we have explained, 
equal protection doctrine has changed since the 1970s to require liti­
gants to demonstrate intentional discrimination on the part of some 
bad actor. In Whren, of course, the Supreme Court reminded us that 
the high standard it was setting to prove a Fourth Amendment viola­
tion did not foreclose plaintiffs from attempting to show "intentionally 
discriminatory application of laws [under] the Equal Protection 
Clause."103 But the limited evidence that Courts will consider in de­
termining whether there has been intentional discrimination, exempli­
fied in Davis and Arlington Heights, makes this a nearly impossible 
task in most traffic stop cases. 
A recent Ninth Circuit decision demonstrates the difficulties faced 
by civil rights litigants and by well-meaning courts addressing race­
based traffic stops, while at the same time suggesting how a revised ju­
risprudence of equality might look. In Price v. Kramer, the Ninth Cir­
cuit upheld a damages verdict on behalf of three young men (two 
black and one white) who were stopped by police officers in the City 
of Torrance, California.104 As in Whren, the plaintiffs asserted viola­
tion of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, including that the 
stop of their vehicle was made without any reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause.105 And as in Whren, the clear subtext is race. As the 
Ninth Circuit notes, only the two black men - and not the white man 
in the back seat - were visible to the officers at the time of the stop.106 
The stop, moreover, occurred just after the young men had crossed 
into the City of Torrance, which is only 1.5% black, from the City of 
Los Angeles, which is majority non-Caucasian and 15% black.107 
During the stop, one of the officers told one of the African-American 
young men: "You're not supposed to be here."108 But notably, no race 
discrimination claim was made (or at least none made it to trial), pre­
sumably because proving intentional race discrimination in such a case 
is a near impossibility, absent an officer who admits that the stop was 
based upon race. 
103. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
104. 200 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2000). 
105. Id. at 1240. In addition to alleging an illegal stop, the young men raised two other 
Fourth Amendment claims: that the subsequent search of the vehicle was unlawful and that 
officers used excessive force during the stop. See id. 
106. See id. at 1241. 
107. See id. at 1240. 
108. See id. at 1243. 
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The Ninth Circuit upheld the jury verdict on the illegal stop, con­
cluding that, in contrast to Whren, the evidence supported the conclu­
sion that there was no objectively reasonable basis for the stop.109 
What is most noteworthy about the case, however, is not simply the 
absence of a race discrimination claim, but that the officers actually 
argued for reversal on the ground that the introduction of evidence at 
trial suggesting a racial motivation for the stop "unfairly prejudiced" 
the jury.11° Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Reinhardt rejected the 
officers' argument, explaining that the evidence of racial bias was rele­
vant, because it tended to support the young men's version of events 
- namely, that there was no objectively reasonable basis for the stop, 
and that the officers' race-neutral explanations for the stop (a seat belt 
violation and a broken taillight) were untruthful. The Ninth Circuit 
also found the evidence of racial bias relevant to the question for pur­
poses of punitive damages. 
Price v. Kramer is surely correct to conclude that evidence of racial 
bias is relevant to whether the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated. But it is not relevant merely because it tends to support 
the plaintiffs' version of events (namely that there was no objectively 
reasonable basis for stopping them) and their punitive damages. 
Courts should not have to apologize for allowing evidence of racial 
bias to come before a jury. Under the approach we advocate, the evi­
dence cited by the Ninth Circuit - including the racial compositions 
of the City of Torrance compared to the City of Los Angeles, the fact 
that the white passenger was not visible at the time of the stop, and 
statements like "You're not supposed to be here" - would be more 
than enough to make out a racial discrimination claim against the indi­
vidual officers, even in the absence of any explicit statement of racial 
animus. 
Allowing such a claim to go forward would not require a drastic 
revision of current doctrine; it is in fact quite possible that, had the 
Price plaintiffs made an equal protection claim, they would have sur­
vived summary judgement as to the individual officers under current 
doctrine, based on the same evidence that was presented in support of 
their Fourth Amendment claims. But we would go further than this 
when claims of race-based stops are made. Plaintiffs should also be 
able to make out a prima fade race discrimination claim by showing a 
pattern of stops on the part of individual officers, or even of all officers 
in a Department. This evidence could be used to show that the De­
partment has a "policy or custom" of discriminatory stops, pursuant to 
which individual officers were acting.111 To make out such a claim, 
109. See id. a t  1246-48. 
110. See id. a t  1249. 
111 . Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a munici­
pali ty may only be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the uncons ti tutional actions of its 
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plaintiffs should be allowed discovery into data regarding the race of 
drivers stopped by individual officers and by police departments gen­
erally. Even standing alone, a disproportionately high rate of traffic 
stops of African Americans in, for example, those parts of Torrance 
adjoining the Los Angeles border should suffice to survive summary 
judgment. In conjunction with the more lenient standing rule we ad­
vocate, this showing (if unrebutted) would make it possible for plain­
tiffs like those in Price to obtain injunctive relief against local police 
departments that systematically discriminate based on race.112 
3. Judicial Remedies 
Even if standing and evidentiary rules were revised to allow for 
enhanced judicial attention to race-based stops, one might well won­
der about the judiciary's institutional capacity to craft adequate reme­
dies.113 After all, one might argue, forcing a school district to stop seg­
regating its students based on race provides, at least, a definable 
mandate. Even in McCleskey, had the racial discrimination argument 
prevailed, there is a readily apparent, albeit quite broad, remedy that 
the Court could have ordered - namely, that the death penalty be 
stopped in those categories of capital cases where race could be shown 
generally to affect the outcome. But race-based traffic stops might ap­
pear to present a different circumstance. After all, a police depart­
ment can hardly be enjoined from stopping all black motorists. How is 
a court to remedy, for example, a police department that, as a whole, is 
disproportionately stopping black drivers? 
employees if an official "policy or custom" can be shown. Thus, in an equal protection chal­
lenge, establishing municipal liability would require a showing that the officers' discrimina­
tory actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. See, e.g., Judge v. City of 
Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir. 1998) (to make out equal protection claim against munici­
pality, plaintiff must show a custom or policy resulting in constitutional injury to her); Na­
tional Association of Government Employees v. City Public Service Bd. of San Antonio, 40 
F.3d 698, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1994) (to prove claim under § 1983 based on violation of equal pro­
tection, plaintiff must show that government agency "maintained an official policy or custom 
of discrimination"). In Price v. Kramer, the young men abandoned their claims against the 
City of Torrance. 200 F.3d at 1256. The opinion does not explain why these claims were 
abandoned or whether there had been any discovery regarding a policy or custom of race­
based stops on the part of Torrance police officers. 
112. The Price plaintiffs apparently did not make a claim for injunctive relief, and it is 
almost certain that they would have lacked standing to do so under current doctrine had they 
tried. There is no indication in the opinion that the young men had been stopped before in 
the City of Torr<i.nce or, for that matter, that they had ever driven in the City of Torrance 
before the night of the stop. 
113. This concern is prompted by Professor Evan Caminker's suggestion, in response to 
an earlier draft of this Review, that the real reason that the Court has avoided the approach 
we advocate may be the difficulty in judicially constructing a viable remedy for some types of 
systemic discrimination in the area of criminal justice. This may well be correct, although, 
for the reasons explained in the remaining text of this Section, we believe these difficulties to 
be surmountable. 
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We believe that the remedial problems of the approach we advo­
cate are actually less severe than they might at first appear. As an ini­
tial matter, the recommendation we have made with respect to stand­
ing partially answers the problem of remedy - namely, that where it 
can be shown that a class of people is affected by a police department's 
discriminatory practices, named plaintiffs should have standing to seek 
equitable relief on the class's behalf, whether or not the individual 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that they themselves would be subjected to 
that practice again. 
But broadening the circumstances under which classwide relief can 
be obtained only addresses part of the problem. The more prominent 
difficulty is what relief a court can plausibly order to correct the class­
wide problem. 
While perhaps superficially different, the difficulties in rooting out 
race-based stops from a police department bear some similarities to 
the difficulties in rooting out the vestiges of discrimination from a 
once-segregated school system. The ultimate goal in the latter case is 
to move from a dual system to a unitary system that treats all students 
the same regardless of their race; the ultimate goal in the former is to 
move to a system that treats all motorists the same. At least two forms 
of remedy are apparent, one relatively modest and the other some­
what more drastic. 
The more modest remedy would be for a court to issue an order 
prohibiting a police department from making traffic stops based upon 
the drivers' race (except in situations where they are pursuing a 
specifically described suspect), while at the same time requiring the 
department to keep statistics regarding the race and ethnicity of all 
drivers who are stopped. This statistical data could, in turn, be used to 
demonstrate whether the pattern of race-based stops has in fact ended. 
This is the approach constructed in a recent consent decree, the first of 
its kind, reached between the United States and the State of New 
Jersey.114 As one New Jersey official explained, the idea behind this 
approach is simple: "If discriminatory treatment is made difficult to 
conceal, it will be unlikely to occur."115 
The more drastic remedy, perhaps appropriate in the case of pro­
nounced or intransigent government discrimination, would be for the 
court not only to require the collection of data, but also to impose nu­
merical benchmarks on how many minority motorists may be stopped. 
This borrows from the remedy upheld by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Paradise, in which a federal district court had ordered that, for 
114. See United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999) (con­
sent decree) available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm> (visited 
June 13, 2000). 
115. David Kocieniewski, U.S. Will Monitor New Jersey Police on Race Profiling, N.Y. 
TIMES (late ed.) Dec. 23, 1999, at Al. 
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a period of time, the Alabama Department of Public Safety hire or 
promote a qualified black for every white hired or promoted, as a 
remedy for the department's recalcitrant pattern of discrimination.116 
Taking the Maryland trooper example used earlier, the benchmark for 
black drivers stopped for speeding might be tied to the proportion of 
speeders overall who are black. For a specified period of time, a court 
might require Maryland to stop no more black speeders than wol!ld be 
expected in the absence of discrimination - or, failing that, to demon­
strate some nondiscriminatory reason for this continued disparity. 
There can be no doubt that ending racial discrimination in traffic 
stops, not to mention other discriminatory law enforcement practices, 
would require the federal judiciary to shoulder a burden that it has so 
far been unwilling to take on. As in school desegregation litigation, 
federal courts would necessarily have to exercise ongoing supervisory 
responsibility to ensure that government entities eliminate discrimina­
tory practices like race-based stops "root and branch." But Cole's 
book demonstrates that such practices tear at the very fabric of our 
democracy, and that ending them is essential to restoring the public's 
trust - and especially the trust of racial minorities - in law enforce­
ment. The New Jersey consent decree provides at least some prece­
dent for how federal courts might execute their responsibilities in this 
area. We believe that, with some modifications to existing constitu­
tional jurisprudence, the federal judiciary is fully capable of bearing 
responsibility for uprooting systemic racial discrimination in the crimi­
nal justice system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional law is the place where principles hit the pavement, 
where theories of justice must come to grips with rough-and-tumble 
reality. Cole is to be commended for reminding us that racial inequal­
ity in the administration of criminal justice strikes at the very founda­
tion of our government's legitimacy, for assembling a wealth of evi­
dence supporting the conclusion that people of color are not treated 
fairly, and for connecting street-level inequalities to the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court. The evidence he collects and pres­
ents makes a compelling case that many of the Court's decisions in the 
area of criminal justice should have come out the other way - and 
that our society would be a great deal closer to the ideal of "EQUAL 
JUSTICE UNDER LAW" if they had. 
Cole paints a vivid, if disturbing, portrait of a criminal justice sys­
tem that is a long way from making the promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment a reality. He is surely correct to suggest that the lingering 
116. 480 U.S. 149, 167-71 (1987) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). 
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racial divide on matters of criminal justice, not to mention the wide­
spread distrust of the system within minority communities, can be 
traced to our collective failure to address systemic race and class ine­
quality. While the Court has generally turned a blind eye to such ine­
quality, criminal justice is actually the area among all others where the 
most searching constitutional scrutiny is warranted. 
The weakness in No Equal Justice is its failure to step back and re­
consider overarching constitutional principles, including both those on 
which the Supreme Court has relied and those · on which a recon­
structed jurisprudence of equality might rely. To be sure, there are 
dangers in focusing too much on "first principles."117 But while Cole's 
descriptions of both Supreme Court precedent and the evidence of 
race- and class-based inequalities are painstakingly presented, he does 
not diagnose the underlying malady in our constitutional jurispru­
dence that has resulted in the criminal justice system's failure to live 
up to its promise. Doing so would not only help tie his story together, 
but would likely improve Cole's prescribed remedies. 
In developing a curative vision, our starting point is to remember 
that the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, and indeed of the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself, is not simply to end racial segregation. 
It is, rather, to take seriously our constitutional obligation to root out 
racial injustice within public institutions. This entails more than sim­
ply stopping individual malefactors who are too inept or indifferent to 
mask their discriminatory intent. Even more critically, it demands 
identification and reform of bureaucracies that systematically disad­
vantage racial minorities, through the actions of numerous, unidentifi­
able government actors who may or may not even be conscious of 
their own racial prejudices. 
The obligation to eliminate such inequalities carries special force 
where interests protected by the Bill of Rights, including those provi­
sions that protect the criminally accused, are implicated. No Equal 
Justice makes a compelling argument that fulfilling this obligation will 
require much stronger medicine than the Supreme Court has pre­
scribed. It will require that the Court consider the interplay between 
the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of equality and the liberties 
guaranteed by the original Constitution. It will require that the fed­
eral judiciary scrutinize and uproot practices that - whether or not 
the product of conscious discrimination - continue to deny equality 
to all people. And it will require all of us to recognize that public faith 
in the blind goddess of justice cannot be restored, as long as the sores 
that prevent her from seeing racial inequality are allowed to remain 
unhealed. 
117. See Steiker, supra note 85, at 693. 
